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Abstract—We study the large-coalition asymptotics of finger-
printing and group testing, and derive explicit decoders that
provably achieve capacity for many of the considered models.
We do this both for simple decoders (fast but suboptimal) and
for joint decoders (slow but optimal), and both for informed and
uninformed settings.
For fingerprinting, we show that if the pirate strategy is
known, the Neyman-Pearson-based log-likelihood decoders prov-
ably achieve capacity, regardless of the strategy. The decoder built
against the interleaving attack is further shown to be a universal
decoder, able to deal with arbitrary attacks and achieving the
uninformed capacity. This universal decoder is shown to be
closely related to the Lagrange-optimized decoder of Oosterwijk
et al. and the empirical mutual information decoder of Moulin.
Joint decoders are also proposed, and we conjecture that these
also achieve the corresponding joint capacities.
For group testing, the simple decoder for the classical model
is shown to be more efficient than the one of Chan et al.
and it provably achieves the simple group testing capacity. For
generalizations of this model such as noisy group testing, the
resulting simple decoders also achieve the corresponding simple
capacities.
Index Terms—Fingerprinting, traitor tracing, group testing,
log-likelihood ratios, hypothesis testing.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Fingerprinting
TO protect copyrighted content against unauthorized re-distribution, distributors commonly embed watermarks
or fingerprints in the content, uniquely linking copies to
individual users. If the distributor finds an illegal copy of
the content online, he can then extract the watermark from
this copy and compare it to the database of watermarks, to
determine which user was responsible.
To combat this solution, a group of c pirates may try to form
a coalition and perform a collusion attack. By comparing their
unique versions of the content, they will detect differences in
their copies which must be part of the watermark. They can
then try to create a mixed pirate copy, where the resulting wa-
termark matches the watermark of different pirates in different
segments of the content, making it hard for the distributor to
find the responsible users. The goal of the distributor of the
content is to assign the watermarks to the users in such a way
that, even if many pirates collude, the pirate copy can still be
traced back to the responsible users.
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B. Group testing
A different area of research that has received considerable
attention in the last few decades is group testing, introduced
by Dorfman [12] in the 1940s. Suppose a large population
contains a small number c of infected (or defective) items.
To identify these items, it is possible to perform group tests:
testing a subset of the population will lead to a positive
test result if this subset contains at least one defective item,
and a negative result otherwise. Since the time to run a
single test may be very long, the subsets to test need to be
chosen in advance, after which all group tests are performed
simultaneously. Then, when the test results come back, the
subset of defective items needs to be identified. The goal of
the game is to identify these defectives using as few group
tests as possible, and with a probability of error as small as
possible.
C. Model
The above problems of fingerprinting and group testing can
be jointly modeled by the following two-person game between
(in terms of fingerprinting) the distributor D and the adversary
C (the set of colluders, or the set of defectives). Throughout the
paper we will mostly use terminology from fingerprinting (i.e.
users instead of items, colluders instead of defective items),
unless we are specifically dealing with group testing results.
First, there is a universe U of n users, and the adversary is
assigned a random subset of users C ⊆ U of size |C| = c. This
subset C is unknown to the distributor (but we assume that the
distributor does know the size c of C), and the aim of the game
for the distributor is ultimately to discover C. The two-person
game consists of three phases: (1) the distributor uses an
encoder to generate a fingerprinting code, used for assigning
versions to users; (2) the colluders employ a collusion channel
to generate the pirate output from their given code words; and
(3) the distributor uses a decoder to map the pirate output to
a set C′ ⊆ U .
1) Encoder: The distributor generates a fingerprinting code
X of n binary code words of length `.1 The parameter ` is
referred to as the code length, and the distributor would like `
to be as small as possible. For the eventual embedded water-
mark, we assume that for each segment of the content there
are two differently watermarked versions, so the watermark of
user j is determined by the ` entries in the jth code word of
X .
1In fingerprinting a common generalization is to assume that the entries of
the code words come from an alphabet of size q ≥ 2, but in this paper we
restrict our attention to the binary case q = 2.
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2A common restriction on the encoding process is to assume
that X is created by first generating a bias vector P ∈ (0, 1)`
(by choosing each entry Pi independently from a certain
distribution fP ), and then generating code words Xj ∈ X ac-
cording to P(Xj,i = 1) = Pi. This guarantees that watermarks
of different users j are independent, and that watermarks in
different positions i are independent. Fingerprinting schemes
that satisfy this assumption are sometimes called bias-based
schemes, and the encoders in this paper (both for group testing
and fingerprinting) are also assumed to belong to this category.
2) Collusion channel: After generating X , the code words
are used to select and embed watermarks in the content, and
the content is sent out to all users. The colluders then get
together, compare their copies, and use a certain collusion
channel or pirate attack Θ to determine the pirate output
Y ∈ {0, 1}`. If the pirate attack behaves symmetrically both in
the colluders and in the positions i, then the collusion channel
can be modeled by a vector θ ∈ [0, 1]c+1, consisting of entries
θz = fYi|Zi(1|z) = P(Yi = 1|Z = z) (for z = 0, . . . , c)
indicating the probability of outputting a 1 when the pirates
received z ones and c − z zeroes. A further restriction on
θ in fingerprinting is the marking assumption, introduced by
Boneh and Shaw [6], which says that θ0 = 0 and θc = 1, i.e.,
if the pirates receive only zeros or ones they have to output
this symbol.
3) Decoder: Finally, after the pirate output has been gen-
erated and distributed, we assume the distributor intercepts it
and applies a decoding algorithm to Y , X and P to compute
a set C′ ⊆ U of accused users. The distributor wins the game
if C′ = C and loses if this is not the case.
Fingerprinting vs. group testing: While the above model is
described in fingerprinting terminology, it also covers many
common group testing models. The users then correspond to
items, the colluders translate to defectives, the code X corre-
sponds to the group testing matrix X (where Xj,i = 1 if item j
is included in the ith test), and the pirate output corresponds to
positive/negative test results. The collusion channel is exactly
what separates group testing from fingerprinting: while in
fingerprinting it is commonly assumed that this channel is
not known or only weakly known to the distributor, in group
testing this channel is usually assumed known in advance. This
means that there is no malicious adversary in group testing,
but only a randomization procedure that determines Y . Note
also that in (noisy) group testing, the Boneh-Shaw marking
assumption may not always hold.
D. Related work
Work on the fingerprinting game described above started in
the late 90s, and lower bounds on the code length were estab-
lished of the order ` ∝ c lnn [6], until in 2003 Tardos [40]
proved a lower bound of the order ` ∝ c2 lnn and described
a scheme with ` = O(c2 lnn), showing this bound is tight.
Since the leading constants of the upper and lower bounds
did not match, later work on fingerprinting focused on finding
the optimal leading constant.
Based on channel capacities, Amiri and Tardos [2] and
Huang and Moulin [17] independently derived the optimal
leading constant to be 2 (i.e. an asymptotic code length of
` ∼ 2c2 lnn) and many improvements to Tardos’s original
scheme were made [4], [25], [32], [38] to reduce the leading
constant from 100 to 12pi
2 ≈ 4.93. Recently it was shown
that with Tardos’ original ‘score function’ one cannot achieve
capacity [21], which lead to the study of different score
functions. Based on a result of Abbe and Zheng [1], Meerwald
and Furon [29] noted that a score function designed against the
worst-case attack achieves capacity against arbitrary attacks.
This also lead to a proposal for a capacity-achieving score
function in [33], which achieves the lower bound on the
leading constant of 2.
Most of the work on fingerprinting focused on the setting
of arbitrary, unknown attacks, but some work was also done
on the informed setting, where the decoder knows or tries
to estimate the pirate strategy [10], [16], [24], [28], [33]. It
is well known that for suboptimal pirate attacks the required
code length may be significantly smaller than ` ∼ 2c2 lnn,
but explicit schemes provably achieving an optimal scaling in
` are not known.
Research on the group testing problem started much longer
ago, and already in 1985 exact asymptotics on the code length
for probabilistic schemes were derived as ` ∼ c log2 n [36],
whereas deterministic schemes require a code length of ` ∝
c2 lnn [13], [14]. Later work focused on slight variations
of the classical model such as noisy group testing, where a
positive result may not always correspond to the presence
of a defective item due to ‘noise’ in the test output [3], [9],
[23], [37]. For noisy group testing exact asymptotics on the
capacities (with leading constants) are yet unknown, and so it
is not known whether existing constructions are optimal.
E. Contributions and outline
In this paper we show how to build schemes using log-
likelihood decoders that provably satisfy given bounds on the
error probabilities, and have a code length with the optimal
asymptotic scaling. We do this both for the informed setting
(where θ is known to the decoder) and the universal setting,
where θ is only known to satisfy the marking assumption.
The results for the informed setting for fingerprinting are
summarized in Table I. Simple informed and universal de-
coders are discussed in Sections II and III, and joint informed
and universal decoders are discussed in Sections IV and V
respectively. In-between, Section III-D discusses a completely
different approach to obtain a universal simple decoder (based
on the empirical mutual information decoder of Moulin [30])
and shows how in the end the result is again quite similar.
II. SIMPLE INFORMED DECODING
In this section we will discuss simple decoders with explicit
scheme parameters (code lengths, accusation thresholds) that
provably satisfy given bounds on the error probabilities. The
asymptotics of the resulting code lengths further show that
these schemes are capacity-achieving; asymptotically, the code
lengths achieve the lower bounds that follow from the simple
capacities, as derived in [27].
3TABLE I
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROVABLE ASYMPTOTIC CODE LENGTHS OF THE
INFORMED FINGERPRINTING DECODERS DISCUSSED IN THIS PAPER.
Fingerprinting attack Simple decoding Joint decoding
θint: interleaving attack ` ∼ 2c2 lnn ` ∼ 2c2 lnn
θall1: all-1 attack ` ∼ c lnn(ln 2)2 ` ∼ c log2 n
θmaj: majority voting ` ∼ pic lnn ` ∼ c log2 n
θmin: minority voting ` ∼ c lnn(ln 2)2 ` ∼ c log2 n
θcoin: coin-flip attack ` ∼ 4c lnn(ln 2)2 ` ∼ c log5/4 n
We will follow the bias-based and score-based framework
introduced by Tardos [40], which was later generalized to joint
decoders by Moulin [30]. For simple decoding, this means that
a user j receives a score Sj of the form
Sj =
∑`
i=1
Sj,i =
∑`
i=1
g(xj,i, yi, pi) (1)
and he is accused iff Sj ≥ η for some fixed threshold η.
The function g is sometimes called the score function. Note
that since g only depends on X through Xj , any decoder that
follows this framework is a simple decoder.
A. Simple log-likelihood decoders
Several different score functions g have been considered
before [24], [33], [38], [40], but in this work we will restrict
our attention to log-likelihood scores, which are known to
perform well and which turn out to be quite easy to analyze.
First, when building a decoder we naturally want to be able
to distinguish between two cases: user j is guilty or user j
is not guilty. To do this, we assign scores to users based on
the available data, and we try to obtain an optimal trade-off
between the false positive error (accusing an innocent user)
and the false negative error (not accusing a guilty user). This
problem is well known in statistics as a hypothesis testing
problem, where in this case we want to distinguish between
the following two hypotheses H0 and H1:
H0 : user j is guilty (j ∈ C), (2)
H1 : user j is innocent (j /∈ C). (3)
The Neyman-Pearson lemma [31] tells us that the most pow-
erful test to distinguish between H0 and H1 is to test whether
the following likelihood ratio exceeds an appropriately chosen
threshold η:
Λ(x,y,p) =
fX,Y |P (x,y|p, H0)
fX,Y |P (x,y|p, H1) . (4)
Taking logarithms, and noting that different positions i are
i.i.d., it is clear that testing whether a user’s likelihood ratio
exceeds η1 is equivalent to testing whether his score Sj
exceeds η = ln η1 for g defined by
g(x, y, p) = ln
(
fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H0)
fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H1)
)
. (5)
Thus, the score function g from (5) corresponds to using a
Neyman-Pearson score over the entire code word Xj , and
therefore g is in a sense optimal for minimizing the false
positive error for a fixed false negative error. Score functions
of this form were previously considered in the context of
fingerprinting in e.g. [28], [35], but these papers did not show
how to choose η and ` to provably satisfy certain bounds on
the error probabilities.
B. Theoretical evaluation
Let us first see how we can choose ` and η such that
we can prove that the false positive and false negative error
probabilities are bounded from above by certain values ε1 and
ε2. For the analysis below, we will make use of the following
function M , which is closely related to the moment-generating
function of scores in one position i for both innocent and guilty
users. For fixed p, this function M is defined on [0, 1] by
M(t) =
∑
x,y
fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H0)tfX,Y |P (x, y|p,H1)1−t, (6)
and it satisfies M(t) = E(etSj,i |p,H1) = E(e(t−1)Sj,i |p,H0).
Theorem 1: Let p and θ be fixed and known to the decoder.
Let γ = ln(1/ε2)/ ln(n/ε1), and let the code length ` and
threshold η be chosen as
` =
√
γ(1 +
√
γ − γ)
− lnM(1−√γ) ln
(
n
ε1
)
, (7)
η = (1− γ) ln
(
n
ε1
)
. (8)
Then with probability at least 1 − ε1 no innocent users are
accused, and with probability at least 1 − ε2 at least one
colluder is caught.
Proof: For innocent users j, we would like to prove that
P(Sj > η|H0) ≤ ε1n , where Sj is the user’s total score over
all segments. If this can be proved, then since innocent users
have independent scores, it follows that with probability at
least (1 − ε1n )n ≥ 1 − ε1 no innocent users are accused. To
get somewhat tight bounds, we start by applying the Markov
inequality to eαSj for some α > 0:
P(Sj > η|H1) = P(eαSj > eαη|H1) ≤ E(e
αSj |H1)
eαη
(9)
=
∏`
i=1 E(eαSj,i |H1)
eαη
=
M(α)`
eαη
. (10)
Let us now first switch to guilty users. We will prove that
for some guilty user j, P(Sj < η|H1) ≤ ε2. Again using
Markov’s inequality with some fixed constant β > 0, we get
P(Sj < η|H0) = P(e−βSj > e−βη|H0) ≤ E(e
−βSj |H0)
e−βη
(11)
=
∏`
i=1 E(e−βSj,i |H0)
e−βη
=
M(1− β)`
e−βη
.
(12)
For both guilty and innocent users, we can now obtain bounds
by choosing appropriate values for α and β. Investigating
the resulting expressions, it seems that good choices for α, β
leading to sharp bounds are α = 1 − √γ and β = √γ.
4Substituting these choices for α and β, and setting the bounds
equal to the desired upper bounds ε1n and ε2, we get
P(Sj > η|H1) ≤
M(1−√γ)`
e−
√
γη
e−η =
ε1
n
, (13)
P(Sj < η|H0) ≤
M(1−√γ)`
e−
√
γη
= ε2. (14)
Combining these equations we obtain the given expression for
η, and solving for ` leads to the expression for ` in (7).
Compared to previous papers analyzing provable bounds on
the error probabilities [4], [19], [25], [38], [40], the proof of
Theorem 1 is remarkably short and simple. Note however that
the proof that a colluder is caught assumes that the attack
used by the colluders is the same as the one the decoder is
built against, and that the actual value of ` is still somewhat
mysterious due to the term M(1 − √γ). In Section II-D we
will show how to get some insight into this expression for `.
C. Practical evaluation
Before going into details how the code lengths of Theo-
rem 1 scale, note that Theorem 1 only shows that with high
probability we provably catch at least one colluder with this
decoder. Although this is commonly the best you can hope for
when dealing with arbitrary attacks in fingerprinting2, if the
attack is colluder-symmetric it is actually possible to catch all
colluders with high probability. So instead we would like to
be able to claim that with high probability, the set of accused
users C′ equals the set of colluders C. Similar to the proof for
innocent users, we could simply replace ε2 by ε2c , and argue
that the probability of finding all pirates is the product of their
individual probabilities of getting caught, leading to a lower
bound on the success probability of (1− ε2c )c ≥ 1− ε2. This
leads to the following heuristic estimate for the code length
required to catch all pirates.
Conjecture 1: Let γ in Theorem 1 be replaced by γ′ =
ln(c/ε2)/ ln(n/ε1). Then with probability at least 1 − ε1 no
innocent users are accused, and with probability at least 1−ε2
all colluders are caught.
The problem with this claim is that the pirate scores are
related through Y , so they are not independent. As a result, we
cannot simply take the product of the individual probabilities
(1 − ε2c ) to get a lower bound on the success probability of
1− ε2. On the other hand, especially when the code length `
is large and ε2 is small, we do not expect the event {S1 >
T} to tell us much about the probability of e.g. {S2 > T}
occurring. One might thus expect that {S2 > T} does not
become much less likely when {S1 > T} occurs. But since it
is not so simple to prove a rigorous upper bound on the catch-
all error probability without assuming independence, we leave
this problem for future work.
D. Asymptotic code lengths
Let us now see how the code lengths ` from (7) scale in
terms of c and n. In general this expression is not so pretty,
2In those cases attacks exist guaranteeing you will not catch more than one
colluder, such as the ‘scapegoat’ strategy [22].
but if we focus on the regime of large n (and fixed ε1 and
ε2), it turns out that the code length always has the optimal
asymptotic scaling, regardless of p and θ.
Theorem 2: For large n and fixed ε1 and ε2, the code length
` of Theorem 1 scales as
` =
log2 n
I(X1;Y |P = p) [1 +O(
√
γ)], (15)
where I(X1;Y |P = p) is the mutual information between a
pirate symbol X1 and the pirate output Y . As a result, ` has
the optimal asymptotic scaling.
Proof: First, note that if n → ∞ and ε1, ε2 are fixed,
then γ → 0. Let us first study the behavior of M(1 − √γ)
for small γ, by computing the first order Taylor expansion of
M(1 − √γ) around γ = 0. For convenience, below we will
abbreviate fX,Y |P (x, y|p) by f(x, y|p).
M(1−√γ)
=
∑
x,y
f(x, y|p,H0) exp
(
−√γ ln
(
f(x, y|p,H0)
f(x, y|p,H1)
))
(16)
=
∑
x,y
f(x, y|p,H0)
(
1−√γ ln
(
f(x, y|p,H0)
f(x, y|p,H1)
)
+O(γ)
)
(17)
= 1−√γ
∑
x,y
f(x, y|p,H0) ln
(
f(x, y|p,H0)
f(x, y|p,H1)
)
+O(γ).
(18)
Here the second equality follows from the fact that if
f(x, y|p,H0) = 0, then the factor f(x, y|p,H0) in front of the
exponentiation would already cause this term to be 0, while if
f(x, y|p,H0) > 0, then also f(x, y|p,H1) > 0 and thus their
ratio is bounded and does not depend on γ. Now, recognizing
the remaining summation as the mutual information (in natural
units) between a colluder symbol X1 and the pirate output Y ,
we finally obtain:
M(1−√γ) = 1− I(X1;Y |P = p)√γ ln 2 +O(γ). (19)
Substituting this result in the original equation for `, and noting
that the factor ε1 inside the logarithm is negligible for large
n, we finally obtain the result of (15).
Note that in the discussion above, we did not make any
assumptions on p. In fact, both Theorems 1 and 2 hold for
arbitrary values of p; the decoder always achieves the capacity
associated to that value of p. As a result, if we optimize and
fix p based on θ (using results from [27, Section II]), we
automatically end up with a decoder that provably achieves
capacity for this attack.
E. Fingerprinting attacks
Let us now consider specific pirate attacks which are often
considered in the fingerprinting literature, and investigate the
resulting code lengths. We will again consider the following
five attacks of [27], which were also considered in e.g. [10],
[16], [17], [24], [28], [29], [33]. Recall that θz = fY |Z(1|z) is
the probability of the pirates outputting a 1 when they received
z ones.
5• Interleaving attack: The coalition randomly selects a
pirate and outputs his symbol. This corresponds to
(θint)z =
z
c
. (0 ≤ z ≤ c) (20)
• All-1 attack: The pirates output a 1 whenever they can,
i.e. whenever they have at least one 1. This translates to
(θall1)z =
{
0 if z = 0;
1 if z > 0.
(21)
• Majority voting: The colluders output the most common
received symbol. This corresponds to
(θmaj)z =
{
0 if z < c2 ;
1 if z > c2 .
(22)
• Minority voting: The colluders output the least common
received symbol. This corresponds to
(θmin)z =
{
0 if z = 0 or c2 < z < c;
1 if z = c or 0 < z < c2 .
(23)
• Coin-flip attack: If the pirates receive both symbols, they
flip a fair coin to decide which symbol to output:
(θcoin)z =

0 if z = 0;
1
2 if 0 < z < c;
1 if z = c.
(24)
Using Theorem 1 we can now obtain exact, provable ex-
pressions for the code length ` in terms of θ, p, c, n, ε1, ε2.
In general these expressions are quite ugly, but performing
a Taylor series expansion around c = ∞ for the optimal
values of p from [27, Section II.A] we obtain the following
expressions for `. Note that `(θmin) ∼ `(θall1).
`(θint) = 2c
2 ln
(
n
ε1
)[
1 +
√
γ − γ
1−√γ +O
(
1
c2
)]
, (25)
`(θall1) =
c ln
(
n
ε1
)
ln(2)2
[√
γ
(
1 +
√
γ − γ) ln 2
1− 2−√γ +O
(
1
c
)]
,
(26)
`(θmaj) = pic ln
(
n
ε1
)[
1 +
√
γ − γ
1−√γ +O
(
1
c
)]
, (27)
`(θcoin) =
4c
ln(2)2
ln
(
n
ε1
)
(28)
×
 √γ (1 +√γ − γ) ln 2
2−
(
1 + 1√
2
)√γ
−
(
1− 1√
2
)√γ +O(1c
) .
(29)
If we assume that both c→∞ and γ → 0, then we can further
simplify the above expressions for the code lengths. The first
terms between brackets all scale as 1 + O(
√
γ), so the code
lengths scale as the terms before the square brackets. These
code lengths match the capacities of [27].
As for the score functions g, let us highlight one attack
in particular, the interleaving attack. The all-1 decoder will
be discussed in Section II-F, while the score functions for
other attacks can be computed in a similar fashion. For the
interleaving attack, working out the probabilities in (5), we
obtain the following score function:
g(x, y, p) =

ln
(
1 + pc(1−p)
)
if x = y = 0;
ln
(
1− 1c
)
if x 6= y;
ln
(
1 + 1−pcp
)
if x = y = 1.
(30)
F. Group testing models
For group testing, we will consider three models: the classi-
cal (noiseless) model and the models with additive noise and
dilution noise. Other models where the probability of a positive
test result only depends on the tally Z (such as the threshold
group testing models considered in [27]) may be analyzed in
a similar fashion. Note that the classical model is equivalent
to the all-1 attack in fingerprinting, as was previously noted
in e.g. [23], [28], [39].
• Classical model: The test output is positive iff the tested
pool contains at least one defective:
(θall1)z =
{
0 if z = 0;
1 if z > 0.
(31)
• Additive noise model: Just like the classical model, but
if no defectives are tested the result may still be positive:
(θadd)z =
{
r if z = 0;
1 if z > 0.
(r ∈ (0, 1)) (32)
• Dilution noise model: Similar to the classical model, but
the probability of a positive result increases with z:
(θdil)z =
{
0 if z = 0;
1− rz if z > 0. (r ∈ (0, 1)) (33)
We can again expand the expressions of Theorem 1 around
c = ∞ for the optimal values of p from [27, Section II.B],
but with the added parameter r the resulting formulas are quite
a mess. If we also let γ → 0 then we can use Theorem 2 to
obtain the following simpler expressions:
`(θall1) =
c lnn
ln(2)2
[
1 +O
(√
γ +
1
c
)]
, (34)
`(θadd) =
c lnn
ln(2)2 − r ln 2 +O(r2)
[
1 +O
(√
γ +
1
c
)]
,
(35)
`(θdil) =
c lnn
ln(2)2 −O(r ln r)
[
1 +O
(√
γ +
1
c
)]
. (36)
For more detailed expressions for `, one may combine Theo-
rems 1 and 2 with [27, Section II.B]. For the classical model,
working out the details we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1: For the classical group testing model, the
simple decoder for the optimal value p = psall1 ≈ ln 2c is given
6by3
g(x, y, psall1) =

+1 if (x, y) = (0, 0);
−1 +O ( 1c ) if (x, y) = (0, 1);
−∞ if (x, y) = (1, 0);
+c if (x, y) = (1, 1).
(37)
Using this decoder in combination with the parameters η and
` of Theorem 1, we obtain a simple group testing algorithm
with an optimal asymptotic number of group tests of
` ∼ c lnn
ln(2)2
≈ 2.08c lnn ≈ 1.44c log2 n. (38)
This asymptotically improves upon results of e.g. Chan et
al. [7], [8] who proposed an algorithm with an asymptotic
code length of ` ∼ ec lnn ≈ 2.72c lnn. Their algorithm does
have a guarantee of never falsely identifying a non-defective
item as defective (whereas our proposed decoder does not have
this guarantee), but the price they pay is a higher asymptotic
number of tests to find the defectives.
III. SIMPLE UNIVERSAL DECODING
While in the previous section we discussed simple decoders
for the setting where θ is completely known to the decoder,
let us now consider the setting which is more common in
fingerprinting, where the attack strategy is not assumed known
to the decoder. This setting may partially apply to group testing
as well (where there may be some unpredictable noise on
the test outputs) but the main focus of this section is the
uninformed fingerprinting game.
A. The simple interleaving decoder, revisited
Let us now try to investigate how to build a decoder that
works against arbitrary attacks in fingerprinting. To build such
a decoder, Meerwald and Furon [29] previously noted that
Abbe and Zheng [1] proved in a more general context that
under certain conditions on the set of allowed pirate strategies
Θ, a decoder that works against the worst-case attack θ∗ ∈ Θ
also works against arbitrary other attacks θ ∈ Θ. In this case
the set of allowed pirate strategies we consider is the set of
all attacks satisfying the marking assumption Pmark:
Pmark = {θ ∈ [0, 1]c+1 | θ0 = 0, θc = 1}. (39)
For finite c the worst-case attack in fingerprinting (from
an information-theoretic perspective) has been studied in
e.g. [17], [29], but in general this attack is quite messy and
unstructured. Since this attack is not so easy to analyze, let
us therefore focus on the asymptotics of large c and n. Huang
and Moulin [17] previously proved that for large coalitions, the
optimal pirate attack is the interleaving attack. So combining
this knowledge with the result of Abbe and Zheng, perhaps a
3To be precise, for convenience we have scaled g by a factor (c ln 2), and
so also η should be scaled by a factor (c ln 2).
good choice for a universal decoder is the interleaving decoder,
which we recall is given by:
g(x, y, p) =

ln
(
1 + pc(1−p)
)
if x = y = 0;
ln
(
1− 1c
)
if x 6= y;
ln
(
1 + 1−pcp
)
if x = y = 1.
(40)
Let us take a closer look at this decoder. For fixed δ > 0, if we
look at values p ∈ [δ, 1− δ] and focus on the regime of large
c, we can perform a Taylor series expansion around c =∞ to
get ln(1 + x) ∼ x. The resulting expressions then turn out to
be closely related to Oosterwijk et al.’s [33] decoder h:
g(x, y, p) ∼ h(x, y, p)
c
=

+ pc(1−p) if x = y = 0;
− 1c if x 6= y;
+ 1−pcp if x = y = 1.
(41)
This implies that g and h are asymptotically equivalent for
p sufficiently far away from 0 and 1. Since for Oosterwijk
et al.’s score function one generally uses cut-offs on fP (i.e.
only using values p ∈ [δ, 1− δ] for fixed δ > 0) to guarantee
that h(x, y, p) = o(c) (cf. [19]), and since the decoder of
Oosterwijk et al. is known to achieve capacity using these
cut-offs, we immediately get the following result.
Proposition 1: The score function g of (40) together with
the bias density function (encoder) f (δ)P on [δ, 1 − δ] of the
form
f
(δ)
P (p) =
1
(pi − 4 arcsin√δ)√p(1− p) (42)
asymptotically achieve the simple capacity for the uninformed
fingerprinting game when the same cut-offs δ as those of [19]
are used.
So combining the log-likelihood decoder tuned against the
asymptotic worst-case attack (the interleaving attack) with
the arcsine distribution with cut-offs, we obtain a universal
decoder that works against arbitrary attacks.
B. Cutting off the cut-offs
Although Proposition 1 is already a nice result, the cut-
offs δ have been a nagging inconvenience ever since Tardos
introduced them in 2003 [40]. In previous settings it was well-
known that this cut-off δ had to be large enough to guarantee
that innocent users are not falsely accused, and small enough
to guarantee that large coalitions can still be caught. For
instance, when using Tardos’ original score function, it was
impossible to do without cut-offs, and the same seems to hold
for Oosterwijk et al.’s decoder h, since the scores blow up for
p ≈ 0, 1.
Looking at the universal log-likelihood decoder, one thing
to notice is that the logarithm has a kind of mitigating effect on
the tails of the score distributions. For 0 p 1 the resulting
scores are roughly a factor c smaller than those obtained with
h, but where the blow-up effect of h for small p is proportional
to 1p , the function g only scales as ln(
1
p ) in the region of small
p. This motivates the following claim, showing that with this
decoder g we finally do not need any cut-offs anymore!
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defined on [0, 1] by
f∗P (p) =
1
pi
√
p(1− p) , (43)
together asymptotically achieve the simple capacity for the
uninformed fingerprinting game.
Proof: We will argue that using this new universal de-
coder g, the difference in performance between using and not
using cut-offs on fP is negligible for large c. Since the encoder
with cut-offs asymptotically achieves capacity, it then follows
that without cut-offs this scheme also achieves capacity.
Let us first prove that all moments of user scores are finite,
even if no cut-offs are used. We will show that E[g(x, y, p)] <
∞ for any x and y, so that after taking weighted combinations
we also get E(Sj,i|H0/1) <∞. Let us consider the case where
x = y = 1; other cases can be analyzed in the same way. Using
the density function f∗P of (43), we have
E = E[g(1, 1, p)k] (44)
=
∫ 1
0
dp
pi
√
p(1− p) log
k
(
1 +
1− p
cp
)
. (45)
Splitting the interval [0, 1] into two parts [δ, 1] and [0, δ] (where
δ depends on k but not on c) we obtain
E =
∫ 1
δ
dp
pi
√
p(1− p) log
k
(
1 +
1− p
cp
)
(46)
+
∫ δ
0
dp
pi
√
p(1− p) log
k
(
1 +
1− p
cp
)
. (47)
Let us denote the two terms by E1 and E2. For the first term,
we can perform a Taylor series expansion to obtain:
E1 =
∫ 1
δ
dp
pi
√
p(1− p) log
k
(
1 +
1− p
cp
)
(48)
=
∫ 1
δ
dp
pi
√
p(1− p)
(
1− p
cp
+O
(
(1− p)2
c2p2
))k
(49)
≤
∫ 1
δ
dp
pi
√
p(1− p)
(
1
cδ
+O
(
1
c2δ2
))k
(50)
(a)
≤
∫ 1
δ
dp
pi
√
p(1− p) = 1 <∞. (51)
Here (a) follows from considering sufficiently large c while δ
remains fixed. (Note that for large c we even have E1 → 0.)
For the other term we do not expand the logarithm:
E2 =
∫ δ
0
dp
pi
√
p(1− p) log
k
(
1 +
1− p
cp
)
(52)
∝
∫ δ
0
dp√
p
logk
(
1
p
)
(b)→ 0. (53)
The last step (b) follows from the fact that the integration is
done over an interval of width δ, while the integrand scales as
1√
p times some less important logarithmic terms. For arbitrary
k, we can thus let δ = δ(k)→ 0 as a function of k to see that
this is always bounded. Similar arguments can be used to show
that for other values of x, y we also have E[g(x, y, p)k] < 0.
As a result, all innocent and guilty user score moments
are finite, and so for large c from the Central Limit Theorem
it follows that the distributions of user scores will converge
to Gaussians. If the scores of innocent and guilty users are
indeed Gaussian for large c, then as discussed in e.g. [33],
[38] all that matters for assessing the performance of the
scheme are the mean and variance of both curves. Similar to
(53), the effects of small cut-offs on the distribution function
fP are negligible as both means and variances stay the
same up to small order terms. So indeed, in both cases the
‘performance indicator’ [33] asymptotically stays the same,
leading to equivalent code lengths.
Note that the same result does not apply to the score
function h of Oosterwijk et al. [33], for which the effects of
values p ≈ 0, 1 are not negligible. The main difference is that
for small p, the score function h scales as 1p (which explodes
when p is really small), while the log-likelihood decoder g
only scales as ln( 1p ). Figure 1 illustrates the difference in the
convergence of normalized innocent user scores to the standard
normal distribution, when using the score functions g and h.
These are experimental results for c = 10 and ` = 10 000
based on 10 000 simulated scores for each curve, and for both
score functions we did not use any cut-offs. As we can see,
using g the normalized scores S˜j = (Sj −ESj)/
√
VarSj are
close to Gaussian, while using h the curves especially do not
look very Gaussian for S˜j  0; in most cases the distribution
tails are much too large. For the minority voting attack the
resulting curve does not even seem close to a standard normal
Gaussian distribution.
C. Designing the scheme
With the above result in mind, let us now briefly discuss
how to actually build a universal scheme with the interleaving
decoder g. From Theorem 3 it is clear that for generating
biases we should use the arcsine distribution f∗P , and our
decoder will be the interleaving decoder g of (40). What
remains is figuring out how to choose ` and η for arbitrary
attacks.
First, it is important to note that the expected innocent
and guilty scores per segment (µ1 = E(Sj,i|H1) and µ0 =
E(Sj,i|H0)) and the variance of the innocent and guilty scores
(σ21 = Var(Sj,i|H1) and σ20 = Var(Sj,i|H0)) heavily depend
on the collusion channel θ. This was not the case for Tardos’
original decoder [40] and the symmetrized decoder [38], for
which η could be fixed in advance regardless of the collusion
strategy. This means that we will either have to delay fixing η
until the decoding stage, or scale/translate scores per segment
accordingly at each position i.
For choosing the code length ` and threshold η let us
focus on the regime of reasonably large c. In that case,
as argued above the total innocent and guilty scores will
behave like Gaussians, with parameters S1 ∼ N (`µ1, `σ21)
and S0 ∼ N (`µ0, `σ20). To distinguish between these two
distributions, using e.g. Sanov’s theorem the code rate `/ lnn
should be proportional to the Kullbeck-Leibler divergence
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Fig. 1. Estimates of the probability density functions of normalized innocent user scores for c = 10 and ` = 10 000 based on 10 000 simulations of innocent
user scores for each attack. The different lines correspond to the interleaving attack (black), all-1 attack (red), majority voting (green), minority voting (blue),
and the coin-flip attack (yellow), while the gray dashed line corresponds to the standard normal distribution with fZ(z) ∝ exp(− 12 z2). Note that the drops
near densities of 10−4 (the far ends of the curves) occur due to smoothening the curve with only 104 samples, and do not reflect the real distribution tails.
between the two distributions:
d(S0‖S1) = (µ0 − µ1)
2
σ21
+
1
2
(
σ20
σ21
− 1− ln σ
2
0
σ21
)
. (54)
A similar expression appears in [33], [38], where it was
noted that σ0  σ1, so that the first term is the most
important term. In [19], [33] the ratio (µ0−µ1)
2
σ21
was coined
the ‘performance indicator’, and it was argued that this ratio
should be maximized. In [33] it was further shown that when
using their decoder h, this ratio is minimized by the pirates
when they choose the interleaving attack θint. In other words:
assuming scores are Gaussian for large c, the best attack the
pirates can use is the interleaving attack when using h as the
decoder.
Since our new decoder g is very similar to Oosterwijk et
al.’s decoder h (by c · g ≈ h), a natural conjecture would
be that also for this new score function, asymptotically the
best pirate attack maximizing the decoder’s error probabilities
is the interleaving attack. Experiments with g and previous
experiments of [33] with h indeed show that other pirate
attacks (such as those considered in Section II-E) generally
perform worse than the interleaving attack. As a result, a
natural choice for selecting ` would be to base ` on the code
length needed to deal with the (asymptotic) worst-case attack
for this decoder, which we conjecture is the interleaving attack.
And for the interleaving attack we know how to choose ` by
Theorem 1, Equation 25 and Theorem 2:
` =
√
γ(1 +
√
γ − γ)
− lnM(1−√γ) ln
(
n
ε1
)
(55)
= 2c2 ln
(
n
ε1
)[
1 +
√
γ − γ
1−√γ +O
(
1
c2
)]
(56)
= 2c2 lnn
[
1 +O
(√
γ +
1
c2
)]
. (57)
These choices for ` thus seem reasonable estimates for the
code lengths required to deal with arbitrary attacks.
Finally, for choosing η, as argued before this parameter
depends on the pirate strategy θ, which may lead to different
scalings and translations of the curves of innocent and guilty
user scores. What we could do is compute the parameters
µ0/1, σ
2
0/1 based on the pirate output y and normalize the
scores accordingly. This means that after computing user
scores Sj , we apply the following transformation:
S˜j =
Sj − `µ1√
`σ1
. (58)
This guarantees that the scores of innocent users will roughly
be distributed as N (0, 1), and for guilty users this results in
a distribution of the form N (√`(µ0−µ1σ1 ),
σ20
σ21
). To guarantee
that the probability that an innocent user has a score below η
is at least 1− ε1n , it then suffices to let
η˜ =
η − `µ1√
`σ1
≈ Φ−1
(
1− ε1
n
)
∼
√
ln
(
n
ε1
)
, (59)
where Φ denotes the distribution function of the standard nor-
mal distribution N (0, 1). This means that after transforming
the scores, the threshold can be fixed independent of the pirate
strategy.
D. Another simple universal decoder
Besides Oosterwijk et al.’s Lagrangian approach and our
Neyman-Pearson-based approach to obtaining efficient de-
coders, let us now mention a third way to obtain a similar
capacity-achieving universal decoder.
To construct this decoder, we start with the empirical mutual
information decoder proposed by Moulin [30], and for now
let us assume pi ≡ p is fixed4. With this decoder, a user is
assigned a score of the form
Sj =
∑
x,y
fˆX,Y |P (x, y|p) ln
(
fˆX,Y |P (x, y|p)
fˆX|P (x|p)fˆY |P (y|p)
)
(60)
4When pi is not fixed and is drawn from a continuous distribution function
fP , the empirical probabilities considered below do not make much sense,
as each value of pi only occurs once. In that case one could e.g. build a
histogram for the values of p, and compute empirical probabilities for each
bin, or discretize the distribution function for p [21], [32].
9and again the decision to accuse depends on whether this
score exceeds some fixed threshold η. Here fˆ is the empirical
estimate of the actual probability f , i.e., fˆX,Y |P (x, y|p) = |{i :
(xj,i, yi) = (x, y)}|/`. Writing out the empirical probability
outside the logarithm, and replacing the summation over x, y
by a summation over the positions i, this is equivalent to
Sj =
1
`
∑`
i=1
ln
(
fˆX,Y |P (xj,i, yi|p)
fˆX,Y |P (xj,i, yi|p,H1)
)
. (61)
Now, this almost fits the score-based simple decoder frame-
work, except for that the terms inside the logarithm are
not independent for different positions i. To overcome this
problem, we could try to replace the empirical probabilities fˆ
by the actual probabilities f , but to compute fX,Y |P (xj,i, yi|p)
we need to know whether user j is guilty or not. Solving this
final problem using Bayesian inference, we get the following
result.
Lemma 1: Approximating the empirical probabilities in the
empirical mutual information decoder with actual probabilities
using Bayesian inference (with an a priori probability of guilt
of P(j ∈ C) = cn ), this decoder corresponds to using the
following score function m:
m(x, y, p) = ln
(
1 +
c
n
[
fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H0)
fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H1) − 1
])
. (62)
Proof: The value of fX,Y |P (xj,i, yi|p,H1) can be com-
puted without any problems, so let us focus on the term
fX,Y |P (xj,i, yi|p). Using Bayesian inference, we have:
fX,Y |P (x, y|p) = P(j ∈ C)fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H0) (63)
+ P(j /∈ C)fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H1). (64)
Assuming an a priori probability of guilt of P(j ∈ C) = cn
and dividing by fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H1) we get
fX,Y |P (x, y|p)
fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H1) =
c
n
fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H0)
fX,Y |P (x, y|p,H1) + 1−
c
n
. (65)
Taking logarithms, this leads to the expression of (62).
Although this score function looks very similar to the log-
likelihood decoder, there are some essential differences. For
instance, for the all-1 attack we have g(1, 0, p) = −∞ while
m(1, 0, p) = ln(1− cn ) > −∞. For the interleaving attack, for
which we may again hope to obtain a universal decoder using
this approach, we do get a familiar result.
Corollary 2: For the interleaving attack, the Bayesian ap-
proximation of the empirical mutual information decoder of
(62) satisfies
m(x, y, p) =

ln
(
1 + pn(1−p)
)
if x = y = 0;
ln
(
1− 1n
)
if x 6= y;
ln
(
1 + 1−pnp
)
if x = y = 1.
(66)
For values of p ∈ [δ, 1 − δ] with δ > 0 and large c, this
decoder is again equivalent to both the log-likelihood score
function g and Oosterwijk et al.’s score function h:
c · g(x, y, p) ∼ n ·m(x, y, p) ∼ h(x, y, p). (67)
For p ≈ 0, 1 the logarithm again guarantees that scores do not
blow up so much, but due to the factor n in the denominator
(rather than a factor c, as in g) the scores relatively increase
more when p approaches 0 than for the score function g.
IV. JOINT INFORMED DECODING
In this section we will discuss informed joint decoders
which we conjecture are able to find pirates with shorter
code lengths than simple decoders. The asymptotics of the
resulting code lengths further motivate that these schemes may
be optimal, but some open problems remain for proving that
they are indeed optimal.
Following the score-based framework for joint decoders of
Moulin [30], we assign tuples T of size c a score of the form
ST =
∑`
i=1
ST,i =
∑`
i=1
g({xj,i : j ∈ T}, yi, pi). (68)
Note that if θ is colluder-symmetric, then this is equivalent to
ST =
∑`
i=1
g(zT,i, yi, pi), (69)
where zT,i =
∑
j∈T xj,i is the tally of the number of ones
received by the tuple T in position i. For the accusation phase,
we now accuse all users in T iff ST ≥ η for some fixed
threshold η. Note that this accusation algorithm is not exactly
well-defined, since it is possible that a user appears both in a
tuple that is accused and in a tuple that is not accused. For
the analysis we will assume that the scheme is only successful
if the single tuple consisting of all colluders has a score
exceeding η and no other tuples have a score exceeding η,
in which case all users in that guilty tuple are accused. This
may be too pessimistic for evaluating the performance of the
scheme.
A. Joint log-likelihood decoders
For building a joint decoder we would like to be able
to distinguish between the all-guilty tuple and other tuples,
so a natural generalization of the hypotheses H0 and H1
for simple decoding would be to let H0 : T = C and
H1 : T 6= C. However, with this choice of H1, computing
probabilities fZ,Y |P (z, y|p,H1) is complicated: the event H1
does not completely determine fY |Z(y|z), since that depends
on exactly how many colluders are present in T . To be able to
compute the likelihood ratios, we therefore use the following
two hypotheses, which were also used in e.g. [29]:
H0 : all users j ∈ T are guilty (T = C), (70)
H1 : all users j ∈ T are innocent (T ∩ C = ∅). (71)
We again use the corresponding log-likelihood ratio per posi-
tion as our score function g, which is again the logarithm of
the likelihood ratio over all positions i:
g(z, y, p) = ln
(
fZ,Y |P (z, y|p,H0)
fZ,Y |P (z, y|p,H1)
)
. (72)
Using this joint score function g corresponds to a most
powerful test according to the Neyman-Pearson lemma [31],
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so g is in a sense optimal for distinguishing between H0 and
H1. Joint decoders of this form were previously considered in
e.g. [29].
B. Theoretical evaluation
Let us again study how to choose ` and η such that we
can prove that the false positive and false negative error
probabilities are bounded from above by certain values ε1 and
ε2. Below we will again make use of the function M of (6)
where the simple hypotheses have been replaced by our new
joint hypotheses H0 and H1.
Theorem 4: Let p and θ be fixed and known to the decoder.
Let γ = ln(1/ε2)/ ln(nc/ε1), and let the code length ` and
the threshold η be defined as
` =
√
γ(1 +
√
γ − γ)
− lnM(1−√γ) ln
(
nc
ε1
)
. (73)
η = (1− γ) ln
(
nc
ε1
)
, (74)
Then with probability at least 1 − ε1 all all-innocent tuples
are not accused, and with probability at least 1−ε2 the single
all-guilty tuple is accused.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the proof of Theo-
rem 1. Instead of n innocent and c guilty users we now have(
n
c
)
< nc all-innocent tuples and just 1 all-guilty tuple, which
changes some of the numbers in γ, η and ` above. We then
again apply the Markov inequality with α = 1 − √γ and
β =
√
γ to obtain the given expressions for η and `.
For deterministic strategies θ ∈ {0, 1}c+1, choosing the
scheme parameters is much simpler. Similar to [27, Lemma 1],
where it was shown that for deterministic attacks the capacity
is exactly 1c , in this case we get a code length of roughly
c log2 n.
Theorem 5: Let θ be a deterministic attack, and let p be
chosen such that fY |P (1|p) = 12 . Let ` and η be chosen as:
` = log2
(
nc
ε1
)
, η = ln
(
nc
ε1
)
, (75)
Then with probability 1−ε1 all all-innocent tuples will not be
accused, and the single all-guilty tuple will always be accused.
Proof: For deterministic attacks, we have
fZ,Y |P (z, y|p,H0) = fZ|P (z|p)fY |Z(y|z), (76)
fZ,Y |P (z, y|p,H1) = fZ|P (z|p)fY |P (y|p). (77)
As a result, the score function g satisfies
g(z, y, p) =
{
− ln fY |P (y|p) if θz = y;
−∞ if θz 6= y.
(78)
With the capacity-achieving choice of p of [27, Lemma 1], we
have fY |P (y|p) = 12 for y = 0, 1 leading to a score of + ln 2
for a match, and −∞ for cases where yi does not match the
output that follows from θ and the assumption that T is the
all-guilty tuple. For T = C, clearly we will always have a
match, so this tuple’s score will always be ` ln 2, showing that
this tuple is always accused.
For innocent tuples, since f(z, y|p,H1) = 12f(z, y|p,H0) it
follows that in each position i, with probability 12 this tuple’s
score will not be −∞. So with probability 2−`, the tuple’s
score after ` segments will not be −∞, in which case it equals
` ln 2. To make sure that this probability is at most ε1/nc so
that the total error probability is at most ε1, we set 2−` =
ε1/n
c, leading to the resulting expression for `.
Note that for deterministic attacks, any choice of −∞ <
η0 ≤ η works just as well as choosing η; after ` segments all
tuples will either have a score of −∞ or η.
C. Practical evaluation
Theorem 4 does not prove that we can actually find the set of
colluders with high probability, since mixed tuples (consisting
of some innocent and some guilty users) also exist and these
may or may not have a score exceeding η. Theorem 4 only
proves that with high probability we can find a set C′ of c
users which contains at least one colluder. Basic experiments
show that in many cases the only tuple with a score exceeding
η (and thus the tuple with the highest score) is the all-guilty
tuple, and so all mixed tuples have a score below η. Proving
that mixed tuples indeed get a score below η is left as an open
problem.
D. Asymptotic code lengths
To further motivate why using this joint decoder may be the
right choice, the following proposition shows that at least the
resulting code lengths are optimal. The proof is analogous to
the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 6: If γ = o(1) then the code length ` of Theo-
rem 4 scales as
` =
log2 n
1
c I(Z;Y |P = p)
[1 +O(
√
γ)] , (79)
thus asymptotically achieving an optimal scaling of the code
length for arbitrary values of p.
Since the asymptotic code length is optimal regardless of
p, these asymptotics are also optimal when p is optimized to
maximize the mutual information in the fully informed setting.
Finally, although it is hard to estimate the scores of mixed
tuples with this decoder, just like in [34] we expect that the
joint decoder score for a tuple is roughly equal to the sum
of the c individual simple decoder scores. So a tuple of c
users consisting of k colluders and c − k innocent users is
expected to have a score roughly a factor k/c smaller than the
expected score for the all-guilty tuple. So after computing the
scores for all tuples of size c, we can get rough estimates of
how many guilty users are contained in each tuple, and for
instance try to find the set C′ of c users that best matches
these estimates. There are several options for post-processing
that may improve the accuracy of using this joint decoder,
which are left for future work.
E. Fingerprinting attacks
Using Theorem 4 we can obtain exact expressions for ` in
terms of θ, p, c, n, ε1, ε2. For the optimal values of p of [27,
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Section III.A] we can use Theorem 6 to obtain the following
expressions. Note again that `(θmin) ∼ `(θall1).
`(θint) = 2c
2 lnn
[
1 +O
(√
γ +
1
c2
)]
, (80)
`(θall1) = c log2 n
[
1 +O
(√
γ +
1
c
)]
, (81)
`(θmaj) = c log2 n
[
1 +O
(√
γ +
1
c
)]
, (82)
`(θcoin) = c log5/4 n
[
1 +O
(√
γ +
1
c
)]
. (83)
Let us again highlight one resulting decoder in particular; the
one for the interleaving attack. In general we can rewrite the
ratio inside the logarithm as follows:
fZ,Y |P (z, y|p,H0)
fZ,Y |P (z, y|p,H1) =
fY |Z(y|z)
fY |P (y|p) . (84)
For the interleaving attack we further have fY |Z(1|z) = zc and
fY |P (1|p) = p. This leads to the following joint decoder g.
g(z, y, p) =
{
ln(1− zc )− ln(1− p) if y = 0;
ln( zc )− ln(p) if y = 1.
(85)
This means that the joint scores are purely based on the
similarities between the tuple tally z and the expected tuple
tally cp for each position i. If a tuple’s tally z is larger than
the expected tally cp, then the score is positive if y = 1 and
negative otherwise, while if z is smaller than cp, then the score
is positive if y = 0 and negative otherwise. For innocent tuples
this leads to an expected score of roughly 0, while for the
guilty tuple this leads to a high (positive) expected score.
F. Group testing models
Similar to the above, for group testing models we can also
use Theorem 4 to obtain exact expressions for ` in terms of
θ, p, c, n, ε1, ε2 with provable error bounds. For the optimal
values of p of [27, Section III.B] we can use Theorem 6 to
obtain the following refined expressions.
`(θall1) = c log2 n
[
1 +O
(√
γ +
1
c
)]
, (86)
`(θadd) =
c log2 n
1− 12h(r) +O(r2)
[
1 +O
(√
γ +
1
c
)]
, (87)
`(θdil) =
c log2 n
1− ln 22 h(r) +O(r2)
[
1 +O
(√
γ +
1
c
)]
. (88)
Note that as discussed in Theorem 5 the score function for the
classical model is equivalent to simply checking whether some
subset of c items matches the test results, i.e. whether these
would indeed have been the test results, had this subset been
the set of defectives. With high probability, only the correct
set of defectives passes this test.
V. JOINT UNIVERSAL DECODING
Let us now again consider the more common setting in
fingerprinting where the attack strategy θ is assumed unknown
to the distributor. With the results for simple decoding in
mind, and knowing that the interleaving attack is also the
asymptotically optimal pirate attack in the joint fingerprinting
game, we again turn our attention to the decoder designed
against the interleaving attack.
A. The joint interleaving decoder, revisited
Similar to the setting of simple decoding, explicitly proving
that this decoder achieves the uninformed capacity is not
so easy. However, through a series of reductions we can
prove that this decoder is asymptotically capacity-achieving,
for certain parameters ` and η.
Theorem 7: The joint log-likelihood decoder designed
against the interleaving attack, using the score function g
defined by
g(z, y, p) =
{
ln(1− zc )− ln(1− p) if y = 0;
ln( zc )− ln(p) if y = 1.
(89)
and the arcsine distribution encoder f∗P of (43) together
asymptotically achieve the joint capacity for the uninformed
fingerprinting game.
Proof: First, the simple uninformed capacity is asymp-
totically equivalent to the joint uninformed capacity, which
follows from results of Huang and Moulin [17] and Oosterwijk
et al. [33] (and Section II). This means that the simple univer-
sal decoder of Theorem 3 already asymptotically achieves the
joint capacity. We will prove that asymptotically, the proposed
universal joint decoder is equivalent to the universal simple
decoder of Section III, thus also achieving the joint uninformed
capacity.
Suppose we have a tuple T of size c, and suppose in some
segment i there are z users who received a 1 and c− z users
who received a 0. For now also assume that p ∈ [δ, 1 − δ]
for some δ > 0 that does not depend on c. In case y = 0,
the combined simple decoder score of this tuple T (using the
simple universal decoder g of Section III) would be:∑
j∈T
Sj,i = z · g(1, 0, p) + (c− z)g(0, 0, p) (90)
= z ln
(
1− 1
c
)
+ (c− z) ln
(
1 +
p
c(1− p)
)
(91)
∼ −z
c
+
(c− z)p
c(1− p) =
p− z/c
1− p . (92)
On the other hand, if we look at this tuple’s joint score with
the joint universal decoder g of (89), we have
ST,i = g(z, 0, p) = ln
(
1− z/c
1− p
)
(93)
= ln
(
1 +
p− z/c
1− p
)
∼ p− z/c
1− p . (94)
Note that the last step follows from the fact that for large c,
with overwhelming probability we have z = cp + O(
√
cp)
(since Z is binomially distributed with mean cp and variance
cp(1 − p)), in which case (p − z/c)/(1 − p) = o(1). Com-
bining the above, we have that ST,i ∼
∑
j∈T Sj,i. So the
joint universal decoder score for a tuple T is asymptotically
equivalent to the sum of the simple universal decoder scores
for the members in this tuple, if p ∈ [δ, 1− δ].
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Since as argued before the distribution tails [0, δ] and
[1− δ, 1] are negligible for the performance of the scheme for
sufficiently small δ, and since the same result holds for y = 1,
the simple and joint decoders are asymptotically equivalent.
Note that for the uninformed setting, the simple and joint
capacities are asymptotically equivalent, which allowed us to
prove the result. For finite c the joint capacity may be slightly
higher than the simple capacity, but the fact that they are
asymptotically the same does show that there is not as much to
gain with joint decoders as there is with e.g. joint group testing
decoders, where the joint capacity is asymptotically a factor
log2(e) ≈ 1.44 higher than the simple capacity. And since
assigning joint scores to all tuples of size c for each position i
is computationally very involved (and since the resulting joint
scores are very similar to the sum of simple universal scores
anyway) a more practical choice seems to be to use the simple
universal decoder of Section III instead.
VI. DISCUSSION
Let us now briefly discuss the main results in this paper and
their consequences.
A. Simple informed decoding
For the setting of simple decoders with known collusion
channels θ, we have shown how to choose the score functions
g in the score-based framework, as well as how to choose
the threshold η and code length ` to guarantee that certain
bounds on the error probabilities are met. With log-likelihood
decoders, we showed that these decoders achieve capacity
regardless of p and regardless of θ. This means that no
matter which pirate strategy θ and bias p you plug in, this
construction will always achieve the capacity corresponding
to those choices for θ and p. A trivial consequence is that for
the optimal values of p derived in [27], one also achieves the
optimal code length for arbitrary p.
B. Simple universal decoding
Since in fingerprinting it is usually more common to assume
that θ is unknown, we then turned our attention to the
uninformed setting. We showed that the decoder designed
against the interleaving attack, with the score function g given
by
g(x, y, p) =

ln
(
1 + pc(1−p)
)
if x = y = 0;
ln
(
1− 1c
)
if x 6= y;
ln
(
1 + 1−pcp
)
if x = y = 1,
(95)
is actually a universal decoder, and achieves the uninformed
fingerprinting capacity. We also showed how the proposed
universal decoder is very similar to both Oosterwijk et al.’s
decoder h and an approximation of Moulin’s empirical mutual
information decoder m for 0 p 1 by
c · g(x, y, p) ∼ h(x, y, p) ∼ n ·m(x, y, p), (96)
and we highlighted the differences between these decoders
for p ≈ 0, 1. We argued that the proposed decoder g is the
most natural choice for a universal decoder (motivated from
the Neyman-Pearson lemma), and that it has some practical
advantages compared to Oosterwijk et al.’s decoder h, such as
finally being able to get rid of the cut-offs δ on the density
function fP .
C. Joint informed decoding
In Sections IV and V we then turned our attention to joint
decoders, which have the potential to significantly decrease
the required code length ` at the cost of a higher decoding
complexity. We considered a natural generalization of the
simple decoders to joint decoders, and argued that our choice
for the joint score functions g seems to be optimal. There are
still some gaps to fill here, since we were not able to prove
how scores of mixed tuples (tuples containing some innocent
and some guilty users) behave, and whether their scores also
stay below η with high probability. On the other hand, for
deterministic attacks it is quite easy to analyze the behavior
of these decoders, and for arbitrary attacks we did show that
the code lengths have the optimal asymptotic scaling.
D. Joint universal decoding
Finally, for the uninformed setting with joint decoders, we
proved that the joint interleaving decoder achieves the joint
uninformed capacity. Since the joint uninformed capacity is
asymptotically the same as the simple uninformed capacity,
and since joint decoding generally has a much higher com-
putational complexity than simple decoding, this decoder may
not be as practical as the proposed simple universal decoder.
VII. OPEN PROBLEMS
Finally, let us finish by mentioning some open problems
which are left for future work.
A. Analyzing the simple universal decoder
While in Section III we showed that the new simple
universal decoder achieves capacity and how one should
roughly choose the code length ` and threshold η, we did
not provide any provable bounds on the error probabilities
for the uninformed setting. For earlier versions of Tardos’
scheme various papers analyzed such provable bounds [4],
[19], [25], [33], [38] and a similar analysis could be done for
the log-likelihood decoder designed against the interleaving
attack. Perhaps such an analysis may once and for all establish
the best way to choose the scheme parameters in universal
fingerprinting.
B. Dynamic fingerprinting and adaptive group testing
Although this paper focused on applications to the ‘static’
fingerprinting game, in some settings the feedback Y may
be obtained in real-time. For instance, in pay-tv pirates may
try to duplicate a fingerprinted broadcast in real time, while
in group testing it may sometimes be possible to do several
rounds of group testing sequentially. The construction of [22]
can trivially be applied to the decoders in this paper as well to
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build efficient dynamic fingerprinting schemes with the same
asymptotics for the code lengths, but where (i) the order terms
in ` are significantly smaller; (ii) one can provably catch all
pirates regardless of the (asymmetric) pirate strategy; and (iii)
one does not necessarily need to know (a good estimate of)
c in advance [22, Section V]. An important open problem
remains to determine the dynamic uninformed fingerprinting
capacity, which may prove or disprove that the construction
of [22] combined with the universal decoder g of Section III
is asymptotically optimal.
C. Non-binary codes in fingerprinting
In this work we focused on the binary case of q = 2
different symbols for generating the code X , but in (universal)
fingerprinting it may be advantageous to work with larger
alphabet sizes q > 2, since the code length decreases linearly
with q [5], [18]. This generalization to q-ary alphabets was
considered in e.g. [5], [18], [33], [34], [38]. For the results in
this paper we did not really use that we were working with
a binary alphabet, so it seems a straightforward exercise to
prove that the q-ary versions of the log-likelihood decoders
also achieve the q-ary capacities. A harder problem seems
to be to actually compute these capacities in the various
informed settings, since the maximization problem involved
in computing these capacities then transforms from a one-
dimensional optimization problem to a (q − 1)-dimensional
optimization problem.
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